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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature Of The Case
Petitioner-Appellant Zane Jack Fields appeals from the district court's
Memorandum and Order of Dismissal based upon allegations in his successive Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief in which he contended "newly discovered evidence" of the
post-trial and successive post-conviction destruction of his orange camouflage coat,
which was introduced at trial, establishes his innocence and violates Due Process under
the Fourteenth Amendment.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal And First Post-Conviction
Proceedings
The material facts leading to Fields' conviction for the first-degree murder of
Mary Katherine Vanderford and his sentence of death are summarized in State v. Fields
(Fields 1), 127 Idaho 904, 907-09, 908 P.2d 1211 (1995), and will be further discussed in
detail in the argument below.
An Information was filed charging Fields with Mary's first-degree murder based
upon the felony-murder doctrine (##19185/19809, R., pp.17-18).1 After Fields' trial, the
jury found him guilty as charged. (Id., pp.67-104.)

1 These records are not part of the record on appeal and, as discussed below, that alone is
sufficient reason to affirm the district court. However, in the event this Court should
grant an untimely motion permitting consideration of the records, the state will refer to
the records and transcripts by their respective supreme court docket numbers. The
supreme court docket numbers for Fields' underlying trial, sentencing and first postconviction case are ##19185 and 19809. The supreme court docket number for Fields'
first successive post-conviction case is #24119. The supreme court docket number for his
second successive post-conviction case is ##35679/36704. The supreme court docket
number for his third successive post-conviction case is #36508. The supreme court
docket number for his fourth successive post-conviction case, and the subject of the
instant appeal, is #38571-2011. "Brief' refers to Fields' opening brief in the instant case.
1

Fields filed a Motion for New Trial, contending an inmate, Salvador Martinez,
advised he overheard two state witnesses, Joe Heistand and Scott Bianchi, and another
inmate, Raymond Gilcrist, who did not testify at Fields' trial, state "they had lied, or
intended to lie, at Fields' trial in exchange for promised benefits from the authorities."
(##19185/19809, R., pp.l08-12.) After an evidentiary hearing (id., pp.1716-1905), the
district court denied Fields' motion, concluding Martinez's testimony "was not believable
to this court and would not be believable to a jury" and "the testimony of the inmate
witnesses that they had not spoken to Mr. Martinez is credible" (id., pp.144-49).
After Fields' sentencing hearing (##19185/19809, R., pp.1907-08), the district
court found the state had proven three statutory aggravating factors and, after weighing
the collective mitigation against the statutory aggravating factors individually, sentenced
Fields to death on March 7,1991 (id., pp.164-77).
On

April

18,

1991,

Fields

filed

his

first

post-conviction

petition.

(##19185/19809, R., pp.197-203.) An amended petition was filed raising one additional
claim. (Id., pp.218-19.) After an evidentiary hearing (id., pp.221-24), the district court
denied Fields' claims, but withdrew the "utter disregard" statutory aggravating factor
because of the Ninth Circuit's erroneous conclusion that it was unconstitutionally vague,

see Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873, 881 (9 th Cir. 1991) (id., pp.226-235).2 Fields filed
another amended petition and motion for new trial (##19185/19809, Supp. R., pp.9-10),
which was also denied after another evidentiary hearing (id., pp.58-62).
On February 16, 1995, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Fields' conviction,
sentence and denial of post-conviction relief. See Fields I, supra.

The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Arave v.
Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471 (1993).

2
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Statement Of Facts And Course Of Fields' First Successive Post-Conviction Case
After filing a federal writ of habeas corpus, on September 11, 1996, Fields filed
his first successive post-conviction petition. (#24119, R., pp.4-51.) The district court
concluded Fields failed to satisfy the requirements of I.C. § 19-2719 because his claims
were known or reasonably could have been known when he filed his first post-conviction
petition, and entered a final order denying relief. (Id., pp.87-96, 130-35.) The Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision denying post-conviction relief on
September 7, 2000. Fields v. State (Fields II), 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230 (2000).

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Fields' Second Successive Post-Conviction Petition
On August 2, 2002, relying upon Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Fields
filed a "Petition for Post-Conviction Relief or Writ of Habeas Corpus" and "Motions to
Correct Illegal Sentences, to Vacate Sentences of Death and for New Sentencing Trial."
(#35679, R., pp.5-14.) The state responded, asking that the petition be dismissed because
Ring does not apply retroactively (id., pp.37-46), which the district court granted (id.,
pp.293-304).

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court.

Fields v. State

(Fields III), 149 Idaho 399, 234 P.3d 723 (2010).

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Fields' Third Successive Post-Conviction Petition
On June 27, 2002, Fields filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Scientific Testing,
requesting testing of "three distinct pieces of evidence" including DNA testing of Fields'
coat admitted at trial as exhibit 22, comparison of nineteen latent fingerprints taken from
the murder scene with a national fingerprint data base ("AFIS"), and DNA testing of
fingernail scrapings from Mary's body. (#36508, R., pp.7-14.) Fields noted the coat "has
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been in the possession of the courts since admission at trial, and currently is within the
custody and control of Patricia Miller, Appeals Clerk at the Ada County Courthouse."
(Id., p.8.)

On August 30, 2002, the state responded and attached a proposed Order

relating to the coat. (Id., pp.52-59.) Pursuant to Fields' motion, which is not part of the
record, coupled with the "concurrence of the State," the district court entered an order on
December 3, 2002, for release of the coat "by the Ada County Clerk's Office to a
representative of law enforcement for transport to the Idaho State Police Forensic Lab for
DNA testing. The coat is to be returned to the Ada County Court Clerk's Office at the
completion of the DNA testing" and "is to be transported and contained in such a manner
as to protect the integrity of the evidence and the chain of custody." (Id., pp.64-65.) That
same day, Fields responded to the state's earlier response (id., pp.68-71) and complained
he would "prefer[] to submit the coat for DNA testing to a lab other than the Idaho State
Police Forensic Laboratory" ("State Lab") (id., pp.68-69). The coat was retrieved on
December 9, 2002 by Gary Starkey (#38571-2011, R., pp.48-49) and tested by the State
Lab on January 2, 2003, but it was determined there was an inadequate sample to do
additional testing (id., p.55).

This information was conveyed to Fields' attorney by

prosecutor Roger Bourne on February 3, 2003. (Id., p.54.)
Nevertheless, Fields waited until October 10, 2003, to file a Motion for
Independent Scientific Testing requesting independent testing of the coat. (#36508, R.,
pp.77-78.) The state's objection was filed on October 31,2003. (Id., pp.84-84.) While
he filed several motions for production of documents (#36508, R., pp.117 -20) and access
to evidence (id., pp.123-31), which the district court generally granted (id., pp.151-54),
Fields never noticed a hearing on the motion seeking independent testing of the coat.

4

After additional testing and comparisons were completed on other evidence, the
state filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting the testing and comparisons failed to produce
results favorable to Fields (#36508, R., pp.176-78), which the district court granted (id.,
pp.257-61). Fields never noticed for hearing or otherwise expressed any interest in his
Motion for Independent Scientific Testing of the coat. On May 25, 2011, the Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Fields v. State (Fields IV),
151 Idaho 18,253 P.3d 692 (2011).

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Fields' Fourth And Instant Successive PostConviction Petition
On August 27, 2010, pursuant to Ada County Exhibits Clerk Margaret
Lundquist's ("Lundquist") request, Bourne sent a letter explaining the coat was destroyed
after it was tested by the State Lab. (#38571-2011, R., pp.76-78.) The letter detailed the
coat's chain of custody, beginning with it being obtained by Starkey in 2002. (Id., p.76.)
After testing was completed by the State Lab, on April 16, 2003, the coat was retrieved
by Shawna Hilliard, who was in charge of the Boise Police Department Crime Lab
("Boise Lab") at that time. (Id., p.77.) Bridget Kinney, who was subsequently in charge
of the Boise Lab, located a February 17, 2004 e-mail to Detective Dave Smith, asking
what should be done with the coat. (Id., pp.77, 79.) Smith responded it should be
destroyed. (Id.) A February 16, 2004 Property Invoice revealed the coat was scheduled
for destruction (id., p.80), and Vicki Drown, who was in charge of the Ada County
Sheriff's Property Room, informed Bourne "the coat was no doubt destroyed according
to the instruction on the property invoice" (id., p.77). Bourne explained the decision to
destroy the coat was made without his consultation or someone from the prosecutor's
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office, and he assumed "neither Shawna Hilliard, Bridget Kinney or Dave Smith
remembered the requirements of the Order probably due to the passage of time. (Id.)
The record does not reveal if the letter was sent to Fields' attorneys.
On October 10, 2010, Fields filed the instant successive Petition for PostConviction Relief raising another claim of "actual innocence" and a due process claim
both based upon destruction of the coat. (Id., pp.l0-19.) The state responded, asking that
the petition be summarily dismissed. (Id., pp.88-100.) Fields responded (id., pp.142-45),
conceding he "did not further pursue DNA testing of the coat," but contending that was
because of "the State's own repeated concessions - in writing - that any allegation of
blood on the coat could not have contributed to a guilty verdict." (Id., p.143.) The state
subsequently filed an affidavit from Smith with attachments (id., pp.162-72), explaining
why he approved the coat's destruction (id., p.163), as follows:
5.

. . .. When asked by Ms. Kinney in the email what to do with the
coat, your affiant recalls thinking that since fourteen (14) years had
elapsed since the trial and since no further testing could be done on
the coat, the coat was of no further value and could be disposed of.
Your affiant was aware that the Idaho State Forensic Laboratory
had determined that there was no blood sample left on the coat for
DNA testing. Your affiant was not aware that the Court had
ordered that the coat be returned to the clerk's office. Your affiant
had no intention of destroying anything that had evidentiary value
and would not have ordered its destruction if it had appeared to
your affiant that the coat had any evidentiary value. As stated
above, your affiant assumed with the passage of time that the
evidentiary portion of the case was long since over;

6.

Your affiant was in no way attempting to interfere with the
defendant's right to a fair trial. Your affiant assumed that the coat
had no further value since the trial was over.

On February 18, 2011, the district court denied post-conviction relief.
pp.185-95.) Fields' Notice of Appeal was filed February 25, 2011. (Id., pp.196-99.)
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(Id.,

ISSUES
Fields states the issues on appeal as follow:
Has Fields shown that the new evidence of the coat's destruction is
material evidence that casts doubt on the reliability of his conviction,
entitling him to post-conviction relief or to an evidentiary hearing to
establish his innocence?
Does Detective Smith's intentional destruction of a material,
exculpatory defense exhibit, in violation of a court order to preserve and
return it, while Fields was seeking independent scientific testing of it,
violate the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
(Brief, p.3.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows:
Has Fields failed to provide an adequate record to review his
claims that the district court erred in dismissing his successive postconviction petition because the underlying records from his trial and prior
post-conviction cases, particularly his third post-conviction petition, are
not included in the record on appeal?
Alternatively,
Because Fields has failed to establish the claims in his successive
petition were filed within forty-two days after they were known or
reasonably should have been known, is this Court without jurisdiction to
hear the claims, requiring this Court to dismiss his appeal or affirm the
district court?
Alternatively,
1.
Is Fields' claim of "actual innocence" barred by I. C. § 192519(5)(b) because it alleges matters that are merely cumulative or
impeaching and does not cast doubt on the reliability of his conviction,
and must the claim be rejected because he has failed to support it with
authority and argument, establish a "free-standing" claim of actual
innocence is cognizable, and has failed to establish he is innocent?
2.
Is Fields' due process claim barred by I.C. § 19-2719(5)(b)
because it does not cast doubt on the reliability of his conviction, and must
the claim be rejected because he failed to establish a due process
violation?

7

ARGUMENT
I.

Not Only Has Fields Failed To Establish The District Court Erred By Summarily
Dismissing His Successive Post-Conviction Petition, But Because He Failed To Provide
This Court With The Underlying Record To Support His Claims And Establish His
Claims Are Timely, The District Court Must Be Affirmed
A.

Introduction
Fields filed the instant successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief raising

another claim of "actual innocence" and a violation of due process based upon
destruction of the coat. (Id., pp.1O-19.) On appeal, Fields contends the district court
erred by dismissing his actual innocence claim because "Detective Smith's illegal
conduct in this case undermines confidence in the verdict, would likely result in an
acquittal, and mandates that this Court reverse the district court and grant the petition or
remand for an evidentiary hearing." (Brief, p.5.) Fields further contends the district
court erred by dismissing his due process claim because he "presented prima facie
evidence of bad faith and is entitled to discovery and a hearing." (Brief, p.18.) He also
challenges dismissal of his second claim under the Eighth Amendment and the due
process clause of the Idaho Constitution, Art. I, § 13. (Brief, p.19.)
Because the claims in Fields' successive petition are based upon the underlying
record from prior cases, particularly his trial, initial post-conviction, and third successive
post-conviction cases, and he has failed to provide this Court with the record from those
cases, the district court's decision must be affirmed. Even if those records had been
properly provided to this Court, because Fields failed to file his successive petition within
forty-two days after the claims were known or reasonably should have been known, they
are untimely and were properly dismissed.
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As to claim one, an actual innocence claim based upon Detective Smith approving
the coat's destruction, not only is actual innocence not a cognizable claim that Fields fails
to support with argument and authority, but he also failed to overcome the prohibition of

I.e.

§ 19-2719(5)(b) because the evidence of destruction of the coat is cumulative or

impeaching, and would not cast doubt on the reliability of his conviction or sentence.
Moreover, Fields has failed to establish no reasonable juror would have convicted him in
light of the evidence regarding Detective Smith approving the coat's destruction.
As to claim two, a due process claim based upon the coat's destruction, Fields has
failed to establish the evidence regarding the coat's destruction would cast doubt on the
reliability of his conviction or sentence as required by I.C. § 19-2719(5)(b), or that
destruction of the coat violates due process. Because he did not raise this claim under the
Eighth Amendment and Idaho Constitution in his successive petition, it must be rejected.

B.

Fields Failed To Provide An Adequate Record On Appeal To Review His Claims
Fields contends the district court erred by denying the claims in his fourth

successive post-conviction petition because he provided the court with newly discovered
evidence - destruction of the coat - which allegedly establishes his innocence and a denial
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, all of which is premised upon the
evidence presented at his trial and prior post-conviction cases.

(Brief, pp.3-19.)

However, Fields has failed to provide an adequate record on appeal to review his claims.
Although he filed a Motion to Take Judicial Notice before the district court asking the
court to take judicial notice of the "files and transcripts in the underlying criminal case,
initial post-conviction" and his first (supreme court docket number 24119) and third
successive post-conviction petitions (supreme court docket number 36508) (#38571-

9

2011, R., ppJ 05-41), there is no indication in the record the motion was noticed for
hearing or otherwise considered by the district court.
More importantly, Fields has failed to move to augment the record or ask this
Court to take judicial notice of any of his prior cases. The appellant bears the burden of
providing a record on appeal to substantiate his claims. State v. Toney, 130 Idaho 858,
860-61, 949 P.2d 1065 (Ct. App. 1997). It is presumed that any missing portions of the
record support the actions of the court below. State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541, 835
P.2d 1349 (Ct. App. 1992). In the absence of an adequate record on appeal, the appellate
court will not presume error. State v. Sirna, 98 Idaho 643, 644, 570 P.2d 1333, 1334
(1977); State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 819,823,992 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Ct. App. 1999).
Because Fields has not included the records from his underlying conviction, initial
post-conviction case, first successive post-conviction case, or third successive postconviction case, he has failed to present an adequate appellate record for review of the
issues before this Court and, therefore, has failed to establish error.

C.

Standard Of Review
"When this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon

the provisions ofIdaho Code § 19-2719, the proper standard of review this Court should
utilize is to directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of
section 19-2719 have been met, and rule accordingly." Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 51,
55, 156 P.3d 552 (2007) (quoting Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573, 575, 51 P.3d 387
(2002)), remanded on other grounds Hairston v. Idaho, 552 U.S. 1227 (2008).
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D.

Fields' Successive Post-Conviction Petition Is Governed By I.C. § 19-2719
Idaho Code § 19-2719 sets forth special appellate and post-conviction procedures

in all capital cases. Fields IV, 253 P.3d at 967. Capital post-conviction proceedings, like
non-capital post-conviction proceedings which are governed by the Unifonn PostConviction Procedure Act ("UPCP A"), are civil in nature and governed by the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure. Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 470, 903 P.2d 58 (1995).
Idaho Code § 19-2719 does not eliminate the applicability of the UPCPA in capital cases,
but acts as a modifier and "supersedes the UPCP A to the extent that their provisions
conflict." McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144 (1999).
Specifically, I.C. § 19-2719 provides a capital defendant one opportunity to raise
all challenges to the conviction and sentence in a post-conviction relief petition which
must be filed within forty-two days after entry of judgment. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho
795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). The only exception is provided in I.C. § 19-2719(5),
which pennits a successive petition "in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated
that the issues raised were not known and reasonably could not have been known within
the time frame allowed by the statute." Id., 120 Idaho at 807. A capital defendant who
brings a successive petition for post-conviction relief has a "heightened burden and must
make a prima facie showing that issues raised in that petition fit within the narrow
exception provided by the statute." Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at 471.
Additionally, claims which were not known or which could not have reasonably
been known within forty-two days of judgment "must be asserted within a reasonable
time after they are known or reasonably could have been known." Paz v. State, 123
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Idaho 758, 760, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 701. In ascertaining
what constitutes a "reasonable time," the Idaho Supreme eourt has explained,
[A] reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction
relief is forty-two days after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have
known of the claim, unless petitioner shows that there were extraordinary
circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the claim within that
time period. In that event, it still must be filed within a reasonable time
after the claim was known or knowable.
Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642 (2008).
A successive post-conviction petition is "facially insufficient" if it merely alleges

"matters that are cumulative or impeaching or would not, even if the allegations were
true, cast doubt on the reliability of the conviction or sentence." I.e. § 19-2719(5)(b). If
evidence is merely cumulative with evidence already within the possession of the defense
at the time the first petition for post-conviction relief is filed, a procedural bar exists
mandating dismissal of the successive petition. Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 647-49, 8
P .3d 636 (2000).
Even if the petitioner can meet these mandates, I.e. § 19-2719(5)(a) details the
additional requirements that must be met before the successive petition may be heard:
An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition may be
heard because of the applicability of the exception herein for issues that
were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not be
considered unless the applicant shows the existence of such issues by (i) a
precise statement of the issue or issues asserted together with (ii) material
facts stated under oath or affirmation by credible persons with first hand
knowledge that would support the issue or issues asserted. A pleading that
fails to make a showing of excepted issues supported by material facts, or
which is not credible, must be summarily dismissed.

I.e. § 19-2719(5)(a).
If a capital petitioner fails to comply with the requirements of I.e. § 19-2719, the
issues are "deemed to have [been] waived" and "[t]he courts of Idaho shall have no
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power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any such
relief." I.C. § 19-2719(5); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 700. Likewise, failure to meet the
requirements of I.C. § 19-2719(5)(a) mandates dismissal of the successive postconviction petition. Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289-90, 17 P.3d 230 (2000).
In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 213, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), the Idaho Supreme
Court discussed the purpose and policy behind the passage of I.C. § 19-2719:
The underlying legislative purpose behind the statute stated the need to
expeditiously conclude criminal proceedings and recognized the use of
dilatory tactics by those sentenced to death to "thwart their sentences."
The statute's purpose is to "avoid such abuses of legal process by
requiring that all collateral claims for relief . . . be consolidated in one
proceeding .... " We hold that the legislature's determination that it was
necessary to reduce the interminable delay in capital cases is a rational
basis for the imposition of the 42-day time limit set for I.C. § 19-2719.
The legislature has identified the problem and attempted to remedy it with
a statutory scheme that is rationally related to the legitimate legislative
purpose of expediting constitutionally imposed sentences.

E.

Fields Has Failed To Establish The Claims In His Successive Petition Were
Timely Filed
In its response to Fields' successive petition, the state asserted it was untimely

because he failed to make a sufficient showing that the petition was filed within forty-two
days after he knew or reasonably should have known of the claims since he abandoned
his 2003 Motion for Independent Scientific Testing requesting independent testing of the
coat that was destroyed in 2004.

(#38571-2011, R., p.97.)

Fields responded by

contending, "The State's motion contains the very reason that petitioner did not continue
to pursue independent testing of the coat for blood: the State's own repeated concessions
-- in writing -- that any allegation of blood on the coat could not have contributed to a
guilty verdict." (Id., p.143.) Fields further argued, "Given the State's concession in the
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prior DNA proceeding, the parties agreed that Mrs. Vanderford's blood was not on
Fields' coat and that the jury could not reasonably have thought her blood was present.
Accordingly, Fields did not further pursue DNA testing of the coat." (Id.)
Rejecting the state's assertion that Fields' petition is untimely, the district court
applied the wrong standard and erroneously determined the petition was timely, stating:
The Petitioner's abandonment of his Motion for Independent
Testing was reasonable, and the Petitioner was not the party charged with
the safe-keeping of the coat. Drawing the inferences in favor of the
Petitioner as the non-moving party, the Court finds that the present
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is not time-barred under I.e. § 19-2719
because the Petitioner, having abandoned his Motion for Independent
Testing, could not have reasonably known earlier about the destruction of
the coat.
(Id., p.189.)
The question before the district court was not whether Fields' abandonment of his
Motion for Independent Testing was "reasonable" or whether he was the party charged
with the "safe-keeping of the coat"; the question was whether he "knew or reasonably
should have known of the claim" within forty-two days after the coat was destroyed. If
Fields had simply noticed his motion for hearing, which was filed October 10, 2003
(#36508, R., pp.77-78), more than eight months after he was advised the State Lab had
determined the coat could not be tested (id., p.54), he would have learned of the
destruction of the coat in 2004. Rather, because he allegedly agreed with the state's
assessment that independent testing would have no evidentiary value because "[t]he jury
was never given any reason to believe that the sample was the victim's blood to begin
with" (#36508, R., p.82), he chose to abandon his request for further testing and, as a
result, did not learn of the coat's destruction until sometime after Bourne wrote his letter
to Lundquist on August 17,2010 (#38571-2011, R., pp.76-78). Irrespective of whether it
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was "reasonable" to abandon independent testing of the coat, Fields "reasonably should
have known" of the coat's destruction, and hence his claims, well before Bourne's letter
by merely noticing the motion for hearing.

In fact, if Fields had timely noticed his

motion, that may have prevented destruction of the coat since it was filed October 10,
2003, and the coat was not destroyed until sometime after March 16, 2004. (Id., p.80.)
Moreover, Fields' explanation for not filing earlier is not only suspect, but it is
without merit. The state made virtually the same "concession" or argument in its initial
response to Fields' successive petition on August 30, 2002 (#36S08, R., pp.S3-SS), yet,
after the coat was tested by the State Lab and the results were received, Fields still sought
independent testing of the coat, but waited until October 10, 2003, more than seven
months after being advised of the State Lab's test results (id., pp. 77 -79).
Additionally, on June 28, 2004, Fields filed an Amended Motion for Permission
to Conduct Limited Discovery. (Id., pp.88-90.) The state responded on July 22, 2004
(id., pp.91-94), expressly noting Fields' delay in filing motions and prosecuting his case,
stating, "It appears to the State that the petitioner is not serious about the petition and has
failed to timely prosecute the petition itself. More than two years have passed without a
request for a hearing. .. The defendant's petition appears to be nothing more than an
effort to delay proceedings in federal court" (id., pp.93-94).

In his response, Fields

referred to the coat, never implying he was abandoning his motion to have it
independently tested, but contending the reason for delay was to await the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Schriro v. Summerlin, S42 U.S. 348 (2004). (Id., pp.l04OS.) On March 30, 200S, Fields sought the production of various documents (id., 117-

20), and on June S, 200S, he sought "access to all of the evidence collected by the police
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to determine what additional items merit DNA or fingerprint testing" (id., pp.123-31).
The district court granted, in part, Fields' motions on May 5, 2006. (Id., pp.151-54.)
Despite the previous filing of multiple motions for access and discovery, not until
May 2010, well after the district court had denied Fields' third successive post-conviction
petition, did Fields contact Lundquist and request to "examine, photograph and/or
photocopy all of the [sic] Mr. Fields' trial exhibits." (#38571-2011, R., p.82.) On May
25,2010, a member of Fields' legal team went to the courthouse, photographed all ofthe
exhibits that were available, and learned the coat was missing. (Id.) Fields made no
further inquiry into the missing coat until August 31, 2010, when Lundquist was again
contacted and Fields learned of Bourne's letter stating the coat had been destroyed. CId.)
Fields' pattern of seeking access to evidence in a piecemeal and untimely fashion
demonstrates he did not file the instant successive petition within forty-two days after he
"should have known of the claim." As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court, "The
reasonable time at issue is the time necessary to develop sufficient facts to file the postconviction proceeding, not the time necessary to develop all facts that will be offered in
an attempt to prove the claim."

Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 727.

Sufficient facts were

available within forty-two days after the coat's destruction in 2004. However, even if
that was too early to file the petition, certainly when he filed his motion for "access to all
of the evidence collected by the police to determine what additional items merit DNA or
fingerprint testing" on June 5, 2005, Fields should have requested access to the coat. It is
simply unfathomable that Fields waited until May 25, 2010 to "examine, photograph
and/or photocopy all of the [sic] Mr. Fields' trial exhibits" (#38571-2011, R., p.82) and
demonstrates his true motivation in filing multiple and untimely motions for discovery
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and access, coupled with the filing of multiple successive post-conviction petitions, is to
delay his return to federal court and his execution.
Because Fields failed to file his instant successive petition within forty-two days
after he knew or reasonably should have known of the claims, the petition is untimely
requiring that this appeal be dismissed or the district court be affirmed.

F.

Not Only Is Fields' Claim Of "Actual Innocence" Barred By I.C. § 19-2719(5)(b)
Because It Alleges Matters That Are Merely Cumulative Or Impeaching And
Does Not Cast Doubt On The Reliability Of The Conviction, But It Must Be
Rejected Because He Has Failed To Support The Claim With Authority Or
Establish A "Free-Standing" Innocence Claim Is Cognizable In Idaho
1.

Fields Has Failed To Support His "Actual Innocence" Claim With
Authority and Argument

In his brief, Fields contends, "The newly discovered evidence that Detective
Smith intentionally ordered the destruction of a court exhibit, Defense Exhibit 22, in
violation of a court order to preserve and return it and while Fields was seeking
independent testing of it, entitles Fields to post-conviction relief." (Brief, pA.) However,
Fields fails to cite under what statute or rule he believes this "newly discovered evidence"
"entitles" him to post-conviction relief, but merely contends "Detective Smith's illegal
conduct in this case undermines confidence in the verdict, would likely result in an
acquittal, and mandates that this Court reverse the district court and grant the petition or
remand for an evidentiary hearing." (Brief, ppA-5.)
'" When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or
argument, they will not be considered. A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either
authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking. '" State v. Wood, 132 Idaho
88, 94, 967 P.2d 702 (1998) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,
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263,923 P.2d 966 (1996)); see also State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1,20,966 P.2d 1 (1998)
("Creech cites no legal authority to support his claim that his due process rights were
violated. Failure to provide legal citations waives the issue."). Because Fields has not
cited any authority establishing the basis for his actual innocence claim, the manner in
which it is cognizable under Idaho law, or authority for the proposition that he must
establish "a reasonable probability of a different result" and that "a jury would likely
acquit," it has been waived.
The state recognizes Fields cites four cases for the proposition that failure to
disclose information about Detective Smith's alleged "evidence tampering violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, irrespective of the good or bad faith
of the prosecution and even when the misconduct is known only to the police" (Brief,
p.l2), but this does not answer the question of what statute or rule governs presentation
of this claim. Moreover, the claim is not based upon alleged "evidence tampering," but is
based upon "actual innocence."

2.

Idaho Law Does Not Provide A "Free-Standing" Innocence Claim

Presumably Fields did not provide the statutory basis for his "innocence claim"
because none exists in Idaho.

In Fields IV, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the

United States Supreme Court's explanation of actual innocence and its refusal to resolve
the question of whether a free-standing actual innocence claim is cognizable under the
federal Constitution. 253 P.3d at 695-96 (citing House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006),
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)). The Idaho Supreme Court recognized that neither
House nor Schlup "has any application to these proceedings." Fields IV, 253 P.3d at 696.
The Idaho Supreme Court further explained:
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Idaho Code § 19-4901(a) lists the types of claims for which postconviction relief can be granted. Subsection (6) authorizes a limited actual
innocence claim based upon fingerprint or forensic DNA test results that
establish innocence. It applies when the petitioner claims, "[s]ubject to
the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through (g), Idaho Code, that the
petitioner is innocent of the offense."
Id. (brackets in original) (quoting I.e. § 19-4901(a)(6)).
Obviously, Fields' latest claim of "actual innocence" is not premised "upon
fingerprint or forensic DNA test results," but is based upon destruction of the coat. The
state certainly recognizes that in Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 647, 8 P .3d 636 (2000),
the supreme court rejected the state's argument that a claim was waived "merely because
he raised the issue in his first post-conviction petition" since that "would result in Idaho
courts being unable to entertain evidence of actual innocence in successive postconviction petitions." However, the supreme court never stated a free-standing claim of
actual innocence was cognizable under Idaho law, but merely concluded it was not barred
from reviewing new evidence of actual innocence in a successive post-conviction
petition. In fact, in Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 253, 220 P.3d 1066 (2009), the
supreme court, after discussing Sivak, refused to decide "whether due process requires a
free-standing actual innocence exception to the application ofI.C. § 19-4902."
Because actual innocence is not a cognizable post-conviction claim unless it is
based upon fingerprint or forensic DNA test results, Fields' first claim was properly
dismissed by the district court.

3.

Fields' First Claim Merely Alleges Matters That Are Cumulative Or
Impeaching

Fields' claim of actual innocence is based upon Detective Smith approving the
destruction of the coat with Fields contending, "Detective Smith's destruction of the coat
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was relevant as another instance of misconduct, like Smith's feeding the informant
witnesses information about the crime." (Brief, p.6) (emphasis added). While Fields
concedes "the coat may be irrelevant to the substance of inmate informant's testimony,
Smith's destruction is relevant to his pattern and conduct of falsifying and destroying
evidence in this case."

(Id.)

Fields further acknowledges, "along with the other

evidence of misconduct, altered evidence and spoon-fed information to inmate

informants, Detective Smith's destruction of the coat is substantive evidence of his
continuing course of conduct in this case .... " (Brief, p.8) (emphasis added). Finally,
Fields contends Detective Smith's approving the coat's destruction "is yet another
example of his tampering with the evidence to secure or preserve Fields' conviction."

(Id., p.8) (emphasis added).

Apparently, Detective Smith's "pattern and conduct" is

allegedly established by his providing "inmate informant witnesses facts about the crime
to bolster their story that Fields confessed to them" (id.), which is presumably based upon
Detective Smith providing information about the murder to informants Gilcrist, Heistand,
and Bianchi (id., p.12).
As explained above,

I.e. § 19-2719(5)(b) states, "A successive post-conviction

pleading asserting the exception shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it
alleges matters that are cumulative or impeaching .... " Fields' concession that Detective
Smith approving the coat's destruction is "another instance" or "another example,"
"along with the other evidence," that is "relevant to his pattern and conduct of falsifying
and destroying evidence in this case" establishes it is merely cumulative of other
evidence that also establishes "his pattern and conduct of falsifying and destroying
evidence in this case." In other words, Fields is contending there is a "pattern" of
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conduct that was allegedly established even without the evidence of Detective Smith
approving the coat's destruction. Therefore, destruction of the coat is merely cumulative
evidence supporting that alleged pattern, which, under I.C. § 19-27I9(5)(b), is "facially
insufficient" to warrant post-conviction relief in a successive petition. In fact, Fields'
"pattern" of filing successive post-conviction petitions, with another one pending before
the district court, illustrates this latest claim is based upon nothing more than cumulative
evidence that is being utilized in an attempt to add additional pebbles upon a pile of rocks
that crumbles because it is without a foundation.
Because the destruction of the coat is nothing more than cumulative evidence, the
district court properly dismissed Fields' claim of actual innocence since it is barred by
I.C. § I9-27I9(5)(b).

4.

Destruction Of The Coat Does Not Cast Doubt On The Reliability Of
Fields' Conviction Or Sentence

Idaho Code § I9-27I9(5)(b) also mandates that Fields establish Detective Smith
approving the destruction of the coat "cast doubt on the reliability of the conviction or
sentence." Fields' entire argument is based upon the alleged "pattern" discussed above
and the contention that "[t]his was a close case at trial." (Brief, pp.5-I5.) Irrespective of
the alleged "pattern" and "closeness of the case at trial," Fields has failed to meet his
burden of casting doubt on the reliability of the conviction or sentence.
First, Fields' contention that the exhibit was destroyed "while [he] was seeking
independent testing of it" (Brief, p.4) ignores his argument and concession detailed above
that "Given the State's concession in the prior DNA proceeding, the parties agreed that
Mrs. Vanderford's blood was not on Fields' coat and that the jury could not reasonably
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have thought her blood was present. Accordingly, Fields did not further pursue DNA
testing of the coat." (#38571-2011, R., p.143.) Obviously, Fields cannot have it both
ways: either he abandoned the motion to have independent testing completed or he
desired to have the testing completed.
Moreover, this is not a situation in which Detective Smith had control of the coat.
Rather, as detailed above, the coat was a court exhibit maintained by Lundquist that was,
pursuant to the district court's order, given to Starkey who apparently delivered the coat
to the State Lab. (#38571-2011, R., pp.76-79.) After testing by the State Lab revealed
there was no evidence of a bloodstain on the coat, it was retrieved in 2003 by Shawna
Hilliard who was in charge of the Boise Lab. CId.)

Only after the coat had apparently

sat in the Boise Lab for some period of time did the new person in charge of the lab,
Bridget Kinney, e-mail Detective Smith on February 17, 2004, and inquire regarding the
status of the coat. CId.) Detective Smith recognized fourteen years had passed since the
trial, that the coat had no further evidentiary value because the State Lab had determined
there was no blood sample left on the coat for DNA testing thereby permitting its
destruction; he did not know of the district court's order requiring the coat be returned to
the clerk's office. CId., p.163.)
This is hardly evidence of actual innocence based upon alleged police misconduct
that would "cast doubt on the reliability of Fields' conviction or sentence," particularly in
light of the fact there was no further evidentiary value associated with the coat because
there were no blood stains to test and photographs were taken of the coat.
Finally, contrary to Fields' contention, his case was not as "close" as he would
have this Court believe. While the state's case may not have been overwhelming, such as
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cases that establish guilt with a confession to law enforcement, DNA or fingerprint
evidence, ballistics testing or an eyewitness who actually saw the murder, as
demonstrated below, it was certainly very compelling.
On February 11, 1988, at approximately 11 :00 a.m., Mary's husband, Herbert
Vanderford, left his wife working at the Wishing Well gift shop in Boise, Idaho, which
was owned by their daughter, Karen Vanderford.

(##19185/19809, Tr., pp.916-18.)

Mary was still alive when Herbert left that morning. (Id., p.917.) On that same date at
11: 18 a.m., dispatcher Jackie Pyle received a 911 telephone call from Mary stating, "I've
just been stabbed. I'm bleeding." (rd., p.997.) Mary was able to explain she had been
stabbed in the neck and chest, her assailant was no longer at the shop, the assailant was
male and she had been robbed. (Id., pp.997-99.)
During Mary's 911 call, Ralph Simmons entered the store and saw her "propped
up against the comer" of the counter "sitting on her legs in a crouched position facing the
window . . . toward the front of the store" with a "telephone in one hand and her other
hand was to her throat." (##19185/19809, Tr., pp.1008-10.) Simmons "saw a lot of
blood on the front of [Mary's] blouse and sweater. There was blood on her hand that was
holding her throat and blood on the hand that was holding the telephone." (Id., p.1 OIL)
Simmons took the phone from Mary, spoke with the dispatcher and tried to administer
first aid. (Id., pp.999-1000, 1011-12.) Mary stated and gestured that her assailant had
fled through the front door. (Id., pp.l 0 12-13.)
Ada County Detective Randy Folwell was the first law enforcement officer to
arrive and found Mary with Simmons trying to assist her. (##19185/19809, Tr., pp.102122.) While Mary was unable to speak, she moved her head and confirmed her assailant
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was male, no longer in the store and alone. (Id., p.l 022.) Emergency medical personnel
dispatched to the Wishing Well administered first aid and transported Mary to Saint
Alphonsus Hospital. (Id., pp.1 038-44.)
Upon arrival at the emergency room, Mary was in full cardiac arrest and
"bleeding quite a bit from a stab wound in the right side of her neck." (##19185119809,
Tr., p.l091.) Pressure was placed on Mary's neck to stop the bleeding and she was
immediately transported to the operating room, however, she could not be resuscitated.
(Id., p.1093.) Mary was pronounced dead approximately forty-five minutes after first
arriving at the emergency room from the "stab wound in her neck [which] caused her to
lose enough blood that she was not able to sustain adequate blood pressure. She basically
bled to death." (Id., p.l094.)
Dr. Frank Roberts completed an autopsy of Mary's body the following day and
found six wounds on her body, including: (1) "a long incised, ... cleanly cut wound that
extended from behind the right ear and carne around under the right side of the chin"; (2)
"a puncture-type wound located just above the nipple of the right breast"; (3) "a puncture
wound located just on the back at approximately - slightly lower than the one on the
breast"; (4) "[t]he fourth was six inches towards the middle of the body and just slightly
lower than the No.3"; (5) "[t]he fifth was a small laceration between the eyebrows"; and
(6) the sixth wound was "located on the top ofthe ring finger of the left hand" and was a
"defensive wound." (##19185119809, Tr., pp.l061-63.) Dr. Roberts opined a "knifelike
instrument" caused all six wounds. (Id., p.1 067.) Dr. Roberts concurred with Dr. Fazzio
that Mary bled to death from the major wounds caused by the "knifelike instrument."
(Id., pp.l074-75.)

In February 1988, a Shopko customer observed a man attempting to steal a
cassette tape who was wearing a "distinctive orange camouflage jacket." State v. Fields,
115 Idaho 1101, 1102, 772 P.2d 739 (et. App. 1989).

While the specifics of this

"Shopko incident" were not presented to the jury in the murder case, the jacket, which
was confiscated at the time of the "Shopko incident," was admitted during the murder
trial. (##19185119809, Tr., p.1l71.) At least one witness, Keith Edson, identified the
coat as being worn by Fields on the morning of Mary's murder. (Id., p.1218.) Ann
Bradley, a forensic scientist, examined Fields' jacket and found two "extremely small"
spots that, in a "preliminary screening" tested positive for blood.

(Id., pp.1407-12.)

While Bradley was unable to determine whether the blood was human, she explained that
did not necessarily mean it was not human blood. (Id., pp.1410-11.)
To further establish Fields murdered Mary, the state called a number of witnesses
who were in or near the Wishing Well on the morning of her murder. Edson testified he
saw Fields go into the Wishing Well on the morning of Mary's murder, but, because he
could not remember who it was, waited to report the sighting until February 22, 1988,
after watching the news and hearing the name "Zane," which triggered Edson's memory.
(##19185119809, Tr., pp.1197-1214.) Edson had met Fields while both were in prison.

(Id., pp.1190-92.) Edson reported the sighting to police and identified Fields from a
photo array and subsequently in court. (Id., pp.1214-18.) Edson also identified the coat
taken from Fields during the "Shopko incident" as the coat Fields was wearing when
entering the Wishing Well. (Id., p.1218.)
Betty Hornecker was at the Wishing Well at approximately 11:00 a.m. and saw a
man enter the store who "immediately went" to the back of the store "farthest from the
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door." (##19185119809, Tr., p.929.) Homecker kept her eyes on him "all the time"
because "his presence made me very uneasy and I also felt like he was trying to avoid me
and move around the store." (Id., p.929.) While Homecker could not positively identify
Fields as the man, the description she provided fit Fields' general description.

(Id.,

pp.932-34, 954-55.) Mari Munk, who was in the Wishing Well shortly after Homecker,
provided a similar description, although she did not see the man's face. (Id., pp.967-73.)
Nancy Miller, who worked at the Quilt Crossing, a fabric store two blocks from
the Wishing Well, testified that at approximately 12:30 p.m. on the day of Mary's
murder, a man entered the Quilt Crossing "searching and looking very wild-eyed."
(##19185119809, Tr., pp.1100-01.) The man's description fit Fields, who was wearing an
orange coat and jeans with a knife in the coat with a brown wooden handle.

(Id.,

pp.1103-04.) On February 24, 1988, Miller identified Fields as the man in the shop from
a series of photographs shown her by police and subsequently identified him in court.
(Id., pp.11 05-08.)

Miller also identified a coat obtained from Fields as the coat he was

wearing in her shop. (Id., pp.11 09-1 0.) Miller explained that after Fields left her store,
he approached the neighboring T-Shirt Plus shop. (Id., p.1122.)
Vicky Tippetts testified a man came into her shop, T-Shirts Plus, at approximately
12:30 p.m. Tippetts' attention was drawn to the man because "when he first came in he
came and stood right by the cash register and stared at me." (##19185/19809, Tr.,
p.1128.) After stating Tippetts could not help him, the man "looked at me, looked at the
register, looked at the people in the shop and then he looked at me and looked at the
register." (Id., p.1128.) Tippetts was frightened because "[h]is eyes were very wild
looking. They were just very scary eyes to look at. They were evil." (Id., p.1128.)

Tippets provided the same general description of the man as the pnor witnesses,
acknowledged she had identified the man in a photo array and subsequently identified
Fields in court. (Id., pp.1132-35.)

Like Miller, Tippetts also identified a coat obtained

from Fields as the coat he was wearing in her shop. (Id., pp.I136-37.)
Robert Starbard, an employee at the Videon, a video store near the Wishing Well,
testified that at approximately 12:30 p.m. on the afternoon of Mary's murder, a man also
came into his shop "act[ing] real nervous." (#19185/19809, Tr., p.1150.) Starbard had
received a telephone call about the robbery at the Wishing Well at 12: 15 p.m. (Id.,
p.1151.) After giving a general description of the man that matched Fields, Starbard later
identified him as the man from a photo array and subsequently identified him in court.
(Id., pp.1154, 1159-61.)

Starbard was so concerned about Fields' appearance and

mannerisms that he contacted store manager Timothy McWilliams.

(Id., p.115 8.)

McWilliams testified regarding his contact with Starbard, gave a general description of
the man, and identified the man as Fields from a photo array. (Id., pp.1180-85.)
Detective Dave Smith testified regarding information that was provided to the
media, which did not include information regarding whether money had been taken from
the Wishing Well, the location of any money taken from the Wishing Well, the motive
for Mary's murder or the amount of money taken from the Wishing Well.
(##19185/19809, Tr., pp.1369-70.)
Jeffrey Acheson, an inmate at the Idaho State Penitentiary (#319185/19809, Tr.,
p.1420), testified that in late March 1988, Fields initiated several conversations regarding
Mary's murder after the show Crimestoppers came on television.

(Id., pp.1428-30.)

During the show Fields "would sometimes go up and either change the channel, turn the
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TV off, or tum the volume dovvn." (Id., p.1430.) Fields' behavior was "[v]ery full of
anxiety, pretty angry sometimes." (Id., p.1430.) After changing channels or "calm[ing]
down," Fields would say, "They can't pin that on me," or "They're trying to pin that on
me but I took care of that." (Id., pp.1430-31.) Fields indicated "they wouldn't be able to
link him with the [murder]" because "he had taken care of the evidence." (Id., p.1431.)
Another inmate, Joe Heistand, also testified regarding conversations initiated by
Fields between May 2-10, 1989, while they were both in custody. (##19185/19809, Tr.,
pp.14 71-73.) Fields told Heistand "what the store looked like, who was running the
store, where it was located" and that he "had been by it a few times ... must to look at it
for a possible score," meaning "a theft or something of that nature ... [b]urglary,
robbery, whatever." (Id., pp.1477-79.) Fields had learned "that an older lady ran the
store" and that "[w]hen he had seen her she was in there alone." (Id., p.1479.) Fields
told Heistand, "[he] entered the store, went to the back of the store where the till area was
and was getting the money. The lady from the store came from the back room, startled
him - and screaming and hollering. She was asked to cooperate, nothing would happen,
and she didn't cooperate and that's when the stabbing occurred." (Id., p.1480.)

Fields

stated he stabbed her "[i]n the neck and upper shoulder, upper back area ... a few times"
with "an old hickory butcher knife." (Id., p.1481.) Fields acknowledged getting "48 to
50 bucks" in "[p]aper and change." (Id., pp.1481-82.) Fields conceded when he left
Mary was "still alive" and people were in the area of the store that could have seen the
knife. (Id., p.l482.)
A third inmate, Scott Bianchi, also testified that on November 10, 1989, while he
and Fields were in custody together, Fields initiated a conversation regarding Mary's
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murder, stating, "he killed the lady, that he didn't mean to kill her, and that he felt really
bad for her." (##19185119809, Tr., p.l569.) Fields explained the murder occurred "in
the Linda Vista Plaza" in a "gift shop." (Id., p.1569.) Fields stated, "he got startled and
he acted on impulse ... he said once he got started it was like he had to finish the job."
(Id., p.1570.)
Based upon the evidence presented at trial and the de minimus value associated
with Detective Smith approving the destruction of a coat that could no longer be tested
and had been photographed, Fields has failed to cast doubt on the reliability of his
conviction or sentence based upon his claim of actual innocence in claim one.

5.

Fields Has Failed To Establish Actual Innocence

Even if Fields survives the arguments detailed above regarding his actual
innocence claim, it fails because he has not established actual innocence. In Schlup, 513
U.S. at 327 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)), the Supreme Court
adopted the standard for actual innocence, requiring petitioners to establish "a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent," and that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted in light of the new evidence. The petitioner thus is required to make a stronger
showing than that needed to establish prejudice." Id. 513 U.S. at 327 (footnote omitted).
This standard has been recently reaffinned, even in the wake of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), in House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518,536-38 (2006).
The Ninth Circuit has emphasized this standard "is not easy to meet," Gandarela
v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9 th Cir. 2002), and is "narrow" in scope. Shumway v.
Pavne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9 th Cir. 2000). Further, "[tJo be credible, a claim of actual
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innocence must be based on reliable evidence not presented at trial." Id., 223 F.3d at
982. Because such evidence is rare, "in virtually every case, the allegation of actual
innocence has been summarily rejected." Id. The Eighth Circuit has concluded not only
must the evidence be new because it was unavailable at trial, the petitioner must establish
it could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence. Amrine
v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222, 1230 (8 th Cir. 1997); Morris v. Dorrnire, 217 F.3d 556, 559
(8 th Cir. 2000); see also Lyons v. Lee, 316 F.3d 528, 533 (4 th Cir. 2003). In at least the
context of whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted for an actual innocence claim, the
Ninth Circuit concluded petitioners are "required to show some degree of due diligence
in [the] initial factual development." Gandarela, 286 F.3d at 1087.
Based upon the arguments provided in the prior section, Fields has failed to
establish a free-standing claim of actual innocence based upon Detective Smith
approving the coat's destruction.

G.

Not Only Is Fields' Due Process Claim Barred By I.C. § 19-2719(5)(b) Because It
Does Not Cast Doubt On The Reliability Of The Conviction, But It Fails Since
He Has Failed To Establish A Due Process Violation
For the same reasons his actual innocence claim does not cast doubt on the

reliability of his conviction, Fields' due process claim also fails because it is based upon
the same evidence -- destruction of the coat. Additionally, even if Fields could survive
I.C. § 19-2719(5)(b), his claim fails because the coat's destruction does not establish a
due process violation.
While due process mandates the state disclose exculpatory evidence, Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), if the state fails to preserve evidence that is only
"potentially exculpatory," due process is violated only
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the evidence possesses

"exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and is of such a
nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other
reasonably available means."

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984»).

Further, the defendant must demonstrate that the police acted in bad faith in failing to
preserve the evidence. Id. at 488; Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). "The
presence or absence of bad faith by the police for the purposes of the Due Process Clause
must necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence
at the time it was lost or destroyed." Id. at 56 n. *.
Relying upon Supreme Court and Idaho precedent, the Idaho Supreme Court has
also addressed the issue of destroyed evidence:
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
criminal prosecutions comport with prevailing notions of fundamental
fairness. Fundamental fairness requires a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense, which in turn requires what might loosely be
called the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence. Under
this doctrine the state has a duty to disclose to the defendant all material
exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession. Implicit in
this duty to disclose exculpatory evidence is a duty to preserve such
evidence for use by the defense.
Destruction of evidence is not a per se violation of a defendant's
rights and depends upon the nature of the proceeding, nature of the
evidence, and the circumstances surrounding the destruction of the
evidence. In a criminal context, this Court has applied a balancing test
which examines: (1) whether the evidence was material to the question of
guilt or the degree of punishment; (2) whether the defendant was
prejudiced by the loss or destruction of the evidence; and (3) whether the
government was acting in good faith when it destroyed or lost the
evidence. This same standard has been applied in the civil context.
Where the value of the evidence is known, the person asserting the due
process violation has the affirmative burden of establishing the materiality
and prejudice elements of the balancing test. Where the value of the
evidence is unknown, the materiality and prejudice elements are presumed
and the inquiry focuses on the presence of bad faith.
State v. Lewis, 144 Idaho 64, 66-67, 157 P.2d 565 (2007) (quotes and citations omitted).
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Addressing Fields' due process claim, the district court recognized the Supreme
Court has never applied Youngblood's due process protection to post-conviction
destruction of evidence, at least three federal circuits have declined to make such an
extension, see Lovitt v. True, 403 F.3d 171, 187 (4 th Cir. 2005); Ferguson v. Roper, 400
F.3d 635, 638 (8 th Cir. 2005); Cress v. Palmer, 484 F.3d 844, 853 (6 th Cir. 2007), and
Idaho's appellate courts have yet to address the issue. (#38571-2011, R., pp.191-92.)
Nevertheless, the court rejected Fields' claim because he failed to establish destruction of
the coat was material and prejudicial; because Fields failed to meet his burden under the
first two prongs, the court declined to address the issue of bad faith. (Id., pp.192-194.)
Referencing the trial testimony of various witnesses and trial counsel's closing
statement regarding the coat -- all without citation to the record -- Fields contends the
coat was material, exculpatory evidence because "[n]ot having inside pockets, the
camouflage was materially exculpatory evidence." (Brief, pp.16-1 7.) Apparently, "not
having inside pockets" is somehow relevant to "speculation" raised by one of the
witnesses regarding whether "the coat was reversible." (Brief, p.16.) However, because
the state has never contended or disputed there were no pockets on the inside of the coat
or even that the coat was reversible, it is difficult to imagine how the coat "possess[ed] an
exculpatory value that was apparent before [it] was destroyed," see Trombetta, 467 U.S.
at 487, particularly since photographs were taken of the coat before the trial even
commenced. See Garcia v. State Tax Comm., 136 Idaho 610, 615, 38 P.3d 1266 (2002)
(declining to find materiality when there is no challenge to the results of testing).
Fields makes the same argument regarding prejudice, contending, "The pictures
of the coat are not adequate substitutes for the coat: they do not show the absence of
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inside pockets." (Brief, p.17.) However, as recognized by the district court, "because the
State does not dispute the fact, there is no controversy surrounding the inside of the coat
that may only be resolved by examination of the coat itself." (#38571-2011, R., p.9.) It
is absurd to contend prejudice has been established based upon a fact the state does not
dispute -- whether the coat had inside pockets. Moreover, in Garcia, 136 Idaho at 616,
the court recognized there is no prejudice when a defendant waits an inordinate amount
of time to inspect the evidence before it was destroyed. Considering the fact Fields did
not pursue his motion for independent testing and did not even ask to "examine,
photograph and/or photocopy all of the [sic] Mr. Fields' trial exhibits" until May 2010
(#38571-2011, R., p.82), it is incomprehensible how he has demonstrated prejudice.
Finally, Fields contends he has established "prima facie evidence of bad faith"
merely because Detective Smith (1) "knew that he was ordering the destruction of a
defense exhibit in a capital case" which LC.A.R. 38(b) and (d) and the district court's
order prohibited, (2) "was a participant in this litigation" and "must have known that
litigation of this case was ongoing," and (3) should have known of "the practice of the
police department and the prosecutor's office was to preserve all of the evidence, not just
admitted exhibits." (Brief, p.18.) These three contentions fall far short of establishing
anything remotely akin to "prima facie evidence of bad faith." Assuming I.C.A.R. 38(b)
and (d) apply to this case, Fields has presented no evidence establishing Detective Smith
was aware of the rule. Further, not only has Fields failed to establish Detective Smith
was aware of the district court's order, but Detective Smith has sworn, "Your affiant was
not aware that the Court had ordered that the coat be returned to the clerk's office. Your
affiant had no intention of destroying anything that had evidentiary value and would not
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have ordered its destruction if it had appeared to your affiant that the coat had any
evidentiary value."

(#38571-2011, R., p.163.)

Rather, Detective Smith recognized

fourteen years had elapsed since the trial and, because the State Lab determined there was
no blood sample left on the coat for DNA testing, concluded, "the coat was of no further
value and could be disposed of." (Id.)
Even if Detective Smith approving the coat's destruction was negligent, which the
state denies, it was far short of bad faith, which "refers to 'a calculated effort to
circumvent the disclosure requirements' under Brady." Lewis, 144 Idaho at 67. As in
Garcia, 136 Idaho at 617, Fields had the opportunity to inspect and test the coat during
the months and years prior to the coat's destruction. It is simply preposterous, based
upon the time Fields had to examine, test, and photograph the coat, that after the State
Lab concluded there was no blood for DNA testing Detective Smith would approve the
coat's destruction so it could not be reviewed to determine if it had inside pockets,
particularly since the state has conceded it did not.
Whether under I.C. § 19-2719(5)(b) or on the merits, Fields' second claim is
without merit and the district court's decision should be affirmed.

H.

The Eighth Amendment And Idaho Constitution Claims Were Not Raised In
Fields' Successive Petition
As an apparent afterthought, Fields makes a cursory reference to the Eighth

Amendment and Idaho Constitution, Art. I, § 13. (Brief, pp.18-19.) Because neither was
raised as a basis for post-conviction relief in Fields' successive petition, any argument
must be summarily rejected.
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"Idaho Code section 19-4903 mandates that the application for post-conviction
relief 'specifically set forth the grounds upon which the application is based, and clearly
state the relief desired.' 'All grounds for relief ... must be raised in [Fields'] original,
supplemental, or amended application.' I.C. § 19-4908." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50,
56, 106 P.3d 376 (2004). Claims not raised in Fields' application should not be
considered for the first time on appeal. Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 56-58. Because Fields'
successive petition does not assert a claim based upon either the Eighth Amendment or
the Idaho Constitution, any such claim or basis for a claim is not preserved for appeal and
cannot be considered by this Court.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that, because Fields has failed to meet the
requirements of I.C. § 19-2719 that his appeal be dismissed or, alternatively, that the
district court's Memorandum and Order of Dismissal summarily dismissing Fields' postconviction claims be affirmed.
DATED this 22 nd day of December, 2011.
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